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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A. The Failure to Order a Psvchiatric Evaluation and Conduct a Competency
Hearing Violated Mr. Hawlcins' Constitutional Due Process Rights and I.C. 68 18210 and 18-211.
The state and Mr. Hawltins agree that due process prohibits the trial of an individual who
lacks mental competency. Indiana v. Edwards,

U.S. -,

128 S.Ct. 2379,2383 (2008);

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,80 S.Ct. 788 (per curianz); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 95 S.Ct. 896 (1975). Appellant's Opening Brief at 18; Respondent's Brief at 14. And, both
the state and Mr. Hawkins agree that I.C. $9 18-210 and 18-211 require the trial court to order a
psychological evaluation when there is reason to doubt the defendant's competence to assist in
his own defense or understand the proceedings. Id And, both the state and Mr. Hawkins agree
that a trial judge must conduct a.competency hearing, regardless

oE whether defense counsel

requests one, whenever the evidence before the judge raises a bona fide doubt about the
defendant's competence to stand trial. Willianzs 1). Woodford, 384 F.3d 567,603-4 (9"' Cir.
2004). Appellant's Opening Brief at 19; Respondent's Brief at 15. And, finally, both the state
and Mr. Hawlcins agree that to be competent, a defendant must have "a rational as well as a

jkctztal understanding of the proceedings against him" and have "sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of ratiolzal ~~nderstaizding."Dusky v. United

States, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 788 (emphasis added); Appellant's Brief at 18; Respondent's
Brief at 15.
Where the state and Mr. Hawkins disagree is here: the state is urging this Court to make
no distinction between "rational" and "factual" understanding and to find that because Mr.
Hawkins is intelligent and articulale, he was competent to stand trial even though he was also

delusional. Respondent's Brief at 15-24. In th'e alternative, Mr. Hawkins is asking this Court to
hold that the evidence before the trial court of his delusional thinking was such that it raised a
bonajde doubt of his competence to stand trial.
The crux of the state's argument is that even though, in the state's own words, Mr.
Hawltins' defense "possibly even indicated a level of delusional thinking relating to the
commission of the bank robberies and the reasons therefor," Respondent's Brief at 19, there was
no reason to doubt his competency to stand trial. To reach this conclusion, the state is implicitly
asking this Court to hold that there is no difference between a factual and a rational
understanding of the workings of the judicial system and the charges leveled therein. In other
words, the state is asking this Couit to delete the requirement of rationality from the standard for
determining competency. The Court does not want to accept the state's invitation and, moreover,
may not inlight of United States Supreme Court precedent.
The state focuses its argument on Mr. Hawkins' intelligence, his general ability to follow
court rules, and his articulateness. It argues that because Mr. Hawkins was able to file motions,
be responsive and courteous, and display a general understanding of the workings of the criminal
system, he was competent. (Although, one might question how well Mr. Hawkins was able to
file motions and follow rules since he was unable to drdt and serve his subpoenas, including the
one for Richard Armitage, successl'ully.) However, a person can be intelligent, articulate, and
able to read and follow rules of procedure, but still be unable to rationally understand the
proceedings because of delusional thinking. Intelligence and insanity are not mutually exclusive
conditions. Hence, the archetype of the mad genius in popular culture.
Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10"' Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992),

explains how one can have the intellectual capacity to understand the proceedings but still lack
rationality and so be incompetent to stand trial.
It is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court's legal definition of competency . . .
mandates the conclusion that a defendant lacks the requisite rational
understanding if his mental condition precludes him from perceiving accurately,
interpreting, andlor responding appropriately to the world around him. Thus, he
must have 'a rational as well as a factual understanding of proceedings against
him.' Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 789; see also United States v.'Hemsi,
901 F.2d 293,296 (2d Cir. 1990) (petitioner had intellectual understanding of
charges against him but his impaired sense of reality substantially undermined his
judgment and prevented him from cooperating rationally with his lawyer).
Although the facts in each case vary, the circuits addressing competency after
Dusky, including our own, have used a sufficient contact with reality as the
touchstone for ascertaining the existence of a rational understanding. See, e.g.,
Colemaiz [v. Safle], 912 F.2d [1217,] 1227; Hemsi, 901 F.2d at 296; Balfour [v.
Flaws], 892 F.2d [556,] 561; Stricklaizd v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542,. 1551-52 (11'"
Cir. 1984).
949 F.2d at 1551. See also, Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1267-69 (5"' Cir. 1980) (Expert
testimony that the defendant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of trial,
which made him unable to grasp reality, compelled a conclusion of incompetency, even though
the record contained lay testimony relating to rational behavior.)
In Laferty, the defendant was oriented in time and place and aware of the nature of the
court proceedings. Indeed, his behavior was consistent and logical. However, he was paranoid
and delusional, bel~evingthat during a religious revelation he had been instructed to "remove"
his sister-in-law, her infant, and two other people. The Second Circuit found that the trial court
erred in finding Lafferty competent to be tried for murder given his delusional thinking. 449

Mr. Hawkins may have been articulate. (Although, he was unable to speak when it came
time to do closing argument.) He may have been able to draft and file motions. (Although, he

certainly was not very good at filing meritorious motions. The record is replete with motions he
filed that were quickly and soundly denied, and as noted before, he was unsuccessful in
subpoenaing witnesses for his defense.) And, he may have been intelligent. But, he also gave
indication after indication after indication of delusional thinking. Even the state itself admits as
much. Respondent's Brief at 19, (stating that the defense "possibly even indicated a level of
delusional thinking.").
These indications of delusional thinking, from his actions during the robberies
themselves, to his statements to Mr. Calley, to his statements to the police from the moment of
his arrest onward, to his entire theory of the defense, showed a lack of rational understanding
such that the District Court should have entertained a hoizafide doubt of his competency to stand
trial. In this case, the failure to appoint an expert and hold a competency hearing violated the
federal and state constitutional rights to due process and I.C. S 18-211
As set out in the Opening BrieC, Mr. Hawkins now aslts in accord with Dusky, szlpm, and
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183,95 S.Ct. 896,909 (1975), that his convictions be reversed
leaving the state free to retry him if he is now competent to stand trial.
B. In the Alternative, this Case Should Be Remanded for a Determination of
Whether Mr. Hawkins was Competent to Waive his Constitutional Right to
Counsel.
The state and Mr. FIawkins both agree that Irzdiarza v. Edwards, -U.S. -,

128 S.Ct

2379 (2008), applies to this case. Appellant's Brief at 23; Respondent's Brief at 24-27. And,
both the state and Mr. Hawkins agree that Edwards holds that the waiver oF the right to counsel
requires a higher degree of competency than the level of competency required to stand trial.
Edwards, -U.S. at -,

128 S. Ct. at 2386. Appellant's Brief at 23; Respondent's Brief at 25.

The state and Mr. Hawkins disagree in two particulars: first, the state argues that Edwards
did not establish any standard for competency to waive the right to counsel, while Mr. Hawltins,
relying on Edwards and United Slates v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060 (9'h Clr. 2009), pet. for cert.
pending, argues that the relevant inquiry, in other words, the standard, to be considered by the
trial court is "whether the defendant is able to 'carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own
defense without the help of counsel."' Ferguson, 590 F.3d at 1068, quoting Edwards, -U.S. at
-,

128 S.Ct. at 2386.' Second, the state argues that the trial court did make an analysis

consistent with Edwards even though the trial court did not know that Edwards was going to be
decided or that a higher competency level is required to waive counsel than to stand trial. Mr
Hawluus argues that given the District Court could not have known the proper inquiry and could
not have made it, the case should now be remanded for a finding by that court as to whether had
it been aware of Edwards it would have made a different determination regarding Mr. Hawkins'
request to waive counsel.' Appellant's Brief at 25; Respondent's B r i d at 24-27
With regard to the first difference, the cases speak for themselves. While the Supreme
Court declined in Edwarcls to set out a specific test to be applied to determine competency to
waive counsel, the Court did state, as noted in Ferguson, that the relevant question is whether the
ddendant is able to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help
of counsel. Edwards, -U.S. at -,

128 S.Ct. at 2386; Ferguson, 590 F.3d at 1068.

Appellant's counsel quoted this language in the Opening Brief at page 23, but
inadvertently cited only Edwards and not Fergusoiz, even though Fergusoiz is the source for the
full quotation. Counsel apologizes for any confusion caused by this mistalte.
I

There is no doubt that Edwards applies to this case even though it had not been
announced at the time of the trial. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987);
State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790,795, 852 P.2d 1382, 1392 (1993).
5

.

With regard to the dcond difference between the state's argument and Mr. Hawkins's
argument, the record does not indicate that the district court made an Edwards inquiry. The
record does not reflect the District Court considering whether Mr. Hawluns was able to carry out
the basic tasks needed to present his own defense. Rather, when questioning Mr. Hawkins
regarding his desire to proceed pro se all the District Court asked was whether he had ever been
diagnosed or treated for mental illness and/or was taking medication to treat mental illness.
Supp. Tr. p. 13, In. 16-19; Tr. 1140, In. 2-18. This is an inadequate inquiry, as one may have
serious mental illness and be taking medication but still be able to perform the tasks needed to
represent oneself. For example, a person could have an anxiety disorder and still be able to make
a rational assessment of what defense to present and present it in an effective manner. On the
other hand, a person, like Mr. Rawkins, might not have a prior diagnosis, yet still have delusional
thought patterns such that he cannot make a rational assessment of the facts and the law and
present a defense.
The state cites several places in the record which it argues show the District Court making
an analysis under the higher standard of competency set out by Edwards. Respondent's Brief at
26. As shown below, closer inspection shows that the District Court was not applying an
Edwards analysis.
The state's first cite is from a hearing held after the trial, but before sentencing. In
discussing its earlier decision to order a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing, the District
Court stated that throughout the proceedings, the Court had never been given any reason to
believe that Mr. Hawkins had a mental disease or defect that caused him to lack the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him orto assist in his own defense. Tr. 1120, In. 15-25, p.

1121, In. 1-14. While the state argues that this is indicative of a finding that Mr. Hawkins was
able to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his owndefense, this is actually a finding that
is nearly verbatim the finding required to hold someone competent to stand trial. Specifically,
this is a finding that Mr. Hawkins had an understanding of the facts and an ability to consult with
his attorney.; Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 788. And, as the state has
agreed, post-Edwards waiver of the right to counsel requires a greater level of competency than
the level needed to stand trial. Edwards, -U.S. at -,

128 S. Ct. at 2386; Respondent's Brief

at 25.
The state's second cite is from the same hearing. Tr. 13. 1126, in. 1-17. At that point, the
district court stated that Mr. Hawkins's post-trial motions were filed, cited specific rules, and
were well a~ticulated.This the Court concluded, "gives the Couit further reason to believe that,
Mr. Hawltins, you're fully capable and competent to proceed. You understand the scope of these
proceedings. You are filing what would be considered to be very appropriate post-trial motions."
Tr. p. 1126, In. 11-17. Again, the Court was looking at Mr. Hawkins's ability to understand the
proceedings. While the Court made reference to filing appropriate motions, the Court did not
specifically consider whether over the entire course of the trial and post-trial period, Mr.
Hawkins had been capable of performing the basic tasks needed to present his defense. While
filing motions, (note that these post-trial motions that the court praised, stand-by counsel refused
to argue because he believed they were so patently frivolous) is a p a r t of presentation of a
defense, it is far from the whole job. To present his defense, Mr. Hawkins needed to be able to

' As discussed above, this statement by the District Court was not part of a required
competency hearing and it was erroneous because it did not take into account the indications of
irrational delusional thought processes by Mr. Hawkins.

subpoena his witnesses, something he could not do successfully. He needed to make a closing
argument, something he could not do. But, most importantly, he needed to have a non-delusional
understanding of the underlying facts and the theory of the case. And, as even the state admits
when it notes that his defense may have reflected delusional thinking, this most important
foundational element of presenting a case appeared to be beyond Mr. Hawlcins.
The state's next citation comes from the hearing on the motion for a new trial. Tr. p.
1141, in. 23-25, p. 1142, In. 1-10. At that time, the District Court stated that Mr. Hawltins had
filed well articulated motions and that he had demonstrated that he grasped the nature of the
proceedings, understood the process and the criminal justice system. Again, this is the standard
of competency to stand trial - an understanding of the proceedings and an ability to consult with
counsel. Dusky, s u p m This is not a finding that Mr. Hawkins could perform the basic tasks
needed to sepresent himself. An understanding o'the process is nG the equivalent of an ability
to forin and present a rational theory of the case to a jury. Edwards, supm.
The state's final citation comes from the same hearing. Tr. p. 1147, In. 8-16. In those
lines, the District Court states only that it has found Mr. Hawltins competent to proceed prose.
The Court does not articulate anywhere that it has applied a higher or even a different standard in
reaching this decision than it would have applied to a decision finding Mr. Hawkins competent to
stand trial. The statements cited by the state say only that the Court found Mr. Hawkins
competent to stand trial. They say nothing about what standard was applied to reach that
decision or whether the same decision would have been reached had the Court made the key
inquiry: whether Mr. Hawluns was able to perform the basic tasks needed to represent himself.

The state's final argument against remand is thafremand is unnecessary because Mr.
Hawltins had stand-by counsel. Respondent's Brief at 26. However, stand-by counsel is
certainly not the equivalent of counsel. While stand-by counsel might answer individual
questions, stand-by counsel does not organize and present the case. Those tasks fall to the pro se
defendant and the presence of stand-by counsel is not sufficient to override the concerns about
competency addressed in Edwards. Consider Ferguson. In that case, advisory counsel was
appointed. The Ninth Circuit did not find, and did not even suggest, that the presence of an
advisory counsel or stand-by counsel should alter the nature of the fundamental inquiry as to
whether a particular defendant is competent to act in a p r o se capacity.
Based upon Edwards and Fergusorz and the arguments set out in Appellant's Opening
Brief and above, Mr. I-Iawkins requests, that in the event his conviction is not reversed based on
the failure to hold a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial, that this case be
remanded for a finding as to whether under the higher standard of Edwards the district court
would have still found him competent to waive his right to counsel.
111. CONCLUSION
As set out in the Opening Brief and above, the convictions in this case must be reversed
because the District Court el-red in not determining Mr. Hawkins' competency to stand trial. In
the alternative, the case must be remanded to the District Court for a determination of whether
Mr. Hawkins was mentally competent to waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial.
/I
I/
/I
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